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SOCIAL ETHICS IN THE NOVELS OF HARRIET BEECHER STOWE

Alison A. Case
April 20, 1984

Harriet Beecher Stowe has engendered a good deal of critical
contradiction,

both in her own time and since. Most of more extreme

controversy centers on her popular and influential anti-slavery novel,
Uncle
---

Although the New England novels are generally

considered to have some merit as examples of "local color" fiction,
Stowe earned her place in the canon of American literature primarily
on the basis her authorship of UTe.

But the place is an uneasy one.

Q!£ 's pop u 1 a r i t y and imp act rna k e i t t 0
literary history for

it, or its author,

putes about its intellectual,
It has been various

0

moral,

big an eve n tin Arne ric a n
to be disregarded,

but dis-

and artistic legitimacy are rife.

described by critics as disastrous and miracu-

lous, awkward and artful, dishonest and sincere,

keenly intelligent

and irrationally emotionalistic, racist and anti-racist, feminist and
all-too-oppressively feminine.
But whatever else may be said about UTe,

few would dispute that

Stowe wrote it openly, self-consciously, and unapologetical
woman's voice,

in a

which, for a novel addressing social and political

issues of national importance, was at the time something unusual (and
controversial)

in itself.

It is perhaps seems less unusual today,

but

I would suggest that in some respects the controvery has remained
constistent,

and that much of the critical argument about UTe may be

attributed to the problems of interpreting a woman's voice fairly in a
man's

wor ld.
Stowe was clearly more concerned in this novel with appealing to

popular tastes than with establishing herself as a sophisticated
artist.

She relied to a certain extent on the forms of the popular

women's fiction of the day, and the occasional

literary cliches which

result have led many to dismiss the novel as an unusually skilfull
work of "sentimental"l fiction which, predictab
1

and perhaps regret-

tably,

achieved the popularity its author was so clearly angling for.

In fact,

the word "sentimental" effective

serious critical doubts about Uncle

sums up most of the

Cabin, even among those who

consider it, in some respects, a powerful and admirable work.

Many

are decidedly uncomfortable with Stowe's use of the power of emotional
appeal on a political issue like slavery.

It is hard to dispute that

UTC succeeded in raising popular support for abolition where cool,
well-reasoned arguments failed.

Nonetheless, her appeal to "the heart

instead of the head" seems to these critics illegitimate and dangerous, even if the cause was unquestionably a good one.
chief complaint of her contemporary critics,
echoed since.

Thus C.H.

This was the

and it has been often re-

Foster concludes his discussion of UTC (1954)

with the following comment:
In furnishing the popular mind and heart with
unforgettable symbols of slavery, Uncle Tom's
Cabin influenced the people for both good and
evil. ••• it enlisted the popular will in the abolition of slavery as no other work had done; but the
highly personal nature of its argument also made
the Civil War virtually inevitable.
After Uncle
Tom's Cabin, objective analysis of the slavery
issue -;asalmost impossible.,,2
"Sentimentalism" also sums up the discomfort of some feminist
critics.

The value Stowe places on feminine "influence"

within the

home sphere, her emphasis on motherhood and her glorification of
female self-sacrifice (all in keeping with the tradition of "sentimental" fiction) make it easy to see her as adopting and promoting an
oppressive angel-in-the-house doctrine of feminine "influence,"
designed by a male dominated society to keep women from any effective,
independent action.

Ann Douglas, for example, opens The Feminization

of American Culture with UTC's Little Eva, and thus places Stowe in
the center of the sentimental authors she sees idealizing women as

2

powerless parasites. 3
But both Foster and Douglas see another side to Stowe which is
difficult to reconcile with the perceived shortcomings of her "sentimentalism."

Foster recognizes in the cynical comments of Augustine

St. Clare an intelligent and insightful analysis of the abstract
issues of economic and political power which underlie the institution
of slavery, an analysis which gives the book its "masculine edge l/i
~and
. >"~-intellectual bite."4

Douglas too,

sees an awareness of issues

of power, especially as they relate to the sexes, and sees also the
glimmerings of a--covert--female activism: 5

Stowe presents women as,

generally, the moral superiors of men, and in her novels they challenge men's judgement even outside their domestic sphere with confidence and conviction.

Indeed, her own writing of such an indecorous

and unladylike novel as UTC indicates that she could not have been
wholly an advocate of passivity and propriety in women.
These virtues seem to both Foster and Douglas inconsistent with
Stowe's problematic sentimentalism.

Hence Foster argues for a "doub-

leness"6 in Stowe's work, with feminine emotionalism alternating with
masculine analysis, and Douglas suggests in her introduction to UTC
that beneath Stowe's apparent acquiescence to the feminine values of
her time was the hidden,

subversive message that feminine influence

was ineffective unless backed by "less gentle tactics."'
But when critics begin to postulate a kind of authorial schizophrenia in order to be able to reconcile intelligent analysis with
emotional response, femininity with activism, perhaps it is time to
take a new look at our paradigm for interpretation.
unfortunately,
century.

The problem,

is not confined either to literature or to the 19th

Carol Gilligan's recent book on the psychology of women's

ethical perceptions, In

~

Different Voice, points out a similar diffi3

culty of interpretation in current psychological research
cularly in her own field of moral development.

and parti-

Gilligan saw women's

responses to moral questions being interpreted--and found wanting--in
different terms from those in which the women framed moral questions
for themselves.

She found that women, in contrast to men, tend to see

around them "a world comprised of relationships rather than of people
standing alone,

a world that coheres through human connection rather

than through systems of rules."S

Women therefore tend to see moral

obligation as stemming from a basic sense of connection with and
responsibility to other human beings.

The key to moral order is the

maintenance of relationships, connections, and lines of communication,
and moral character may be measured by one's ability to extend the
circle of relationship to strangers and even enemies, and by the
degree to which one accepts responsibility for anyone within it.
Immoral behavior is seen, not so much as rule-breaking, but as a
failure in the communciation of, or response to, human needs.
This "ethic of care" contrasts with a moral view Gilligan found
more associated with men, which she refers to as an ethic of "justice."

The latter locates morality in a concern for "fairness"--for

applying moral rules with objective equality--according the self no
rights not extended to all.

Each of these two ethics require a dif-

ferent "logic" for making moral choices.

One demands a complex under-

standing of the psychological realities of a particular situation--a
"psychological logic"-- to understand exactly what the needs involved
are, how conflicting needs may be weighed against each other, and how
they might best be fulfilled.

The other requires an equally complex

abstract understanding of a ~rarchy of moral laws,

to be able to

determine which takes precedence in a particular situation·

4

In [the women's] conception, the moral problem
arises from conflicting responsibilities rather
than from competing rights and requires for its
resolution a mode of thinking that is contextual
and narrative rather than formal and abstract.
This conception of morality as concerned with the
activity of care centers moral development around
the understanding of responsibility and relationships, just as the conception of morality as fairness ties moral development to the understanding
of rights and rules. 9
Though I

will be referring to them as "masculine" or "feminine,"

these views are by no means exclusive to the genders with which they
are,

in general terms,

They are,

associated,

as Gilligan says,

nor are they mutually exclusive.

"two views of morality which are comple-

mentary rather than sequential or opposed."ID
Gilligan points out in her last chapter,

In fact,

as

at their highest level of

development these two ethics merge in the ideal of "justice tempered
with mercy" --or perhaps,
manageable by

from the other perspective, "mercy made

justice".

But in real life their relationship is more complicated, and here
the gender associations become significant.

Although an ethic of care

and response may be implicit in the highest ideals of a justiceoriented morality,

in our society it has tended to be the masculine

perspective which is accorded moral and intellectual legitimacy.

From

the "justice" perspective, an approach to moral choice which relies on
empathy seems dangerous, in that it undermines the "objectivity"
necessary for a "good" moral choice.
woman's superego is inferior
impersonal, so independent of

Hence Freud says that the

in that it is never '''so inexorable,
~ts

so

emotional origins as we require it

to be in men.,"ll In addition, because an abstract,
is the only one recognized as legitimate,

rule-oriented logic

the "psychological logic" of

the feminine approach seems illogical and unintelligent -- an unreaIt is thinking with the "heart" and

soned, emotional "gut-response."
5

not with the "head."

Thus while women's values affirm what is missing

in the masculine view of morality, namely, "the continuing importance
of attachment in the human life cycle," the prevailing standard of
interpretation "intones the celebration of separation, autonomy,
viduation,

indi-

and natural rights,"12 so that interpretation of women's

moral thought reaffirms women's inadequacy and justifies their inferior

sta tus.
This, I think, has been the problem in criticism of Uncle Tom's

Cabin.

The outlines of the ethical view Gilligan delineates in her

work are clearly visible throughout Stowe's anti-slavery and New
England novels,

and Gilligan's analysis can thus lead to a greater

appreciation of the coherence and intelligence of Stowe's moral
vision,

and help us to tease apart "the description of care and con-

nection from the vocabulary of inequality and oppression" in criticism
of Stowe's work.
On the most basic level, this ethic manifests itself in her
tendency to define characters and
tionships,

situations in terms of their rela-

moral character in terms of empathy and sense of responsi-

bility to fellow-humans,

and spirituality in terms of a sense of

personal connection to and relationship with God.

In other words,

Stowe sees a world which "coheres through human connection."
But this ethical view also emerges on the level of a conscious
concern--one which is central to both the New England and the antislavery novels.

Stowe is quite well aware of the association of her

perspective with women,

and of a more legalistic perspective asso-

ciated with men which tends to dominate in the public realm and which
denies the legitimacy of women's views.
of this masculine view.

Her novels include a critique

Seeing empathy and a sense of personal res-

6

ponsibility as the basis for morality,

she sees that an emphasis on

impersonal rules can become a way of avoiding responsibility,

evading

the claims on the self which any genuine expression of human need
ma ke s.

"Objectivity" becomes a mask for

With this critique in mind,
Stowe's

narrative,~trategies

self-interest.

it becomes necessary to re-evaluate

in a novel such as Uncle Tom's £abin.

Perhaps her appeal to the hearts of her readers does not preclude one
to their heads as well, and perhaps the "objective analysis" which
Stowe made "impossible" was not the only intelligent,

legitimate

response to the moral problem of slavery in the South.
Stowe's New England novels, !he Minister's
Oldtown Folks (1869),

~ooi~

(1859) and

were written several years after Uncle Tom's

Cabin, but they can serve to give us a clearer idea of the conception
of moral order which is implicit in the anti-slavery novels.

Late

Eighteenth Century New England seems to represent for Stowe a stable,
morally healthy society in which law,

social convention, and personal

conviction are essentially in harmony. Disruptions in moral order are
also breaks in the fabric of the community,
common effort.

which are restored by

By looking at the way Stowe presents communities and

characters in this "normal" world, and the way she discusses moral
problems,

we can perhaps get a sense of the ideal which resides behind

Stowe's presentation of the disordered world of the anti-slavery
novels.
The conception of moral order in these novels aligns very closely
with Gilligan's outline of a feminine "ethic of care," and of the
distinctive world-view which shapes it.

Underlying everything in

these novels is a tendency to view relationships as the primary reality in human life, whether relationships between members of a

7

family or community, or those between individuals and God. Stowe sees
the New England community as one which coheres through a network of
'personal relationships, centered on those of the home, and extending
out to include the whole town,
to the world at large.

with connections going out from there

All notions of class and race, or of economic,

political and religious structures are subordinated to this view, in
the eyes of the characters as well as the author.
religious doctrine, too,

She looks at

in terms of its effects upon the sense of

connection and personal relationship with God and fellowhumans which she considers essential to healthy spirituality.
Stowe defines morality in these novels in terms of responsiveness to the needs of others. Moral characters see themselves as
responsible for the whole community, and a strong feeling of empathy
leads them to perceive the sufferings of others as their own.

In

addition to a sense of connectedness with others and an ability to
empathize with suffering, an important element of Stowe's conception
of moral character is the psychological perception needed to understand what another's needs are and what the best way of meeting them
is.
The New England community Stowe describes is fundamentally home~

and family-centered.

The center of action in both novels is the

home--and especially the kitchen--of the major maternal figure of the
story:

Grandmother Badger in OTF and Widow Scudder in

serves as a microcosm of the

community~

its various parts meet and interact.

!~~.

The home

here the representatives of

Thus on a Sunday evening Grand-

mother Badger gathers in her kitchen an assortment of locals ranging
from the eminent Major Broad to the Indians Sally Wonsamug and Betty
Poganut who come begging for food and shelter.
Furthermore,

it is the interrelationships within the family and
8

community which serve to maintain order and ensure that differences do
not result in destructive conflict.

This is most easily seen in OTF,

whose story ranges over a broader cross-section of New England society
than TMW.

Throughout OTF Stowe represents the major social,

poli-

tical, and religious differences of the day -- those between Tories
and revolutionaries, Anglicans and Congregationalists, Arminians and
Calvinists, or simply rich and poor -- through individual characters,
who resolve these differences by subordinating them to a sense of
relationship as fellow-members of a family or community.

Thus Mr. and

Mrs. Badger, Arminian and Calvinist, respectively, resolve the quarrel
between these two creeds by subordinating it to the love and respect
of a lifetime of marriage.
Congregational minister,

The same is true of Parson Lothrop, the

and his Anglican Boston-aristocratic wife.

Within the community as a whole,
again,

this resolution is represented,

by the mingling of classes and creeds in Grandmother's kitchen,

and by the meeting-house.
In the meeting-house the entire community,

from Lady Lothrop to

the poor blacks and Indians who live on the fringes of the community,
ar e all un i ted.

Differences of rank may be, as Stowe says, carefully

observed in the community,

which has its own miniature version of the

House of Lords, House of Commons, and humble populace,l3 but these
seem to express themselves more in "etiquette and solemn observances"
(OTF,p.93)

than in any actual separation of the classes from human

contact with each other. They,

too,

are finally subordinated to the

common bond as members of the same community:
But such as we were, high and low, good and bad,
refined and illiterate, barbarian and civilized,
negro and white, the old meeting-house united us
all on one day of the week, and its solemn services formed an insensible but strong bond of
neighborhood charity •••• rude and primitive as our
9

meeting-houses were, this weekly union of all
classes in them was a most powerful and efficient
means of civilization (OTF,p.IOI).
OTF and TMW also show very clearly a view of morality which
stresses a sense of responsibility, based on this same feeling of
connection to others,
ability.

to help anyone in need to the limits of one's

The truly moral characters in both novels are those who take

on the welfare of the whole community as a personal responsibility.
The Badgers in OTF are prepared,

despite Aunt Lois's protestations

that it will ruin them, to provide a meal and a night's lodging to
anyone who comes to their door, Thanksgiving turkeys to all who ask
for them, and, apparently, a home and education to any orphan who
seems in need of them.

Uncle Fliakim, for his part, seems to have no

interests or pursuits of his own -- he is continually, and energetically,

at the beck and call of his neighbors.

The same is true of the truly moral characters in TMW.

Zebedee

Marvyn, the prototype of the upright and efficient New Englander,
finally has to keep two complete sets of tools: one for his own use,
and one to lend out to needy neighbors.

Further examples abound,

but

the point which should be clear is that Stowe is defining virtue in
terms of willingness to fulfill the needs of others rather than in
terms of adherence to a code of moral rules.

There is no "fairness"

clause in this moral demand -- in fact, Stowe points out that a continued willingness to supply others' needs will inevitably lead to
some exploitation by "those less fortunate persons, who supply their
own lack of considerateness from the abundance of their neighbors"l4
Such an ethic might be seen as simply "the law of the Gospel" -a higher and more difficult moral code rather than a different vision
of morality as growing out of a personal sense of connection, sympathy
and responsibility.

But Stowe also makes clear that sympathy,
10

human

warmth, and the insight to perceive another individual's particular needs, are crucial elements of her "ethic of responsibility."
Further,

such sympathy and insight often put the "right" action at

odds with logical principles of "duty," or any abstract,

impersonal

code of behavior.
n the case of Miss Asphyxia Smith,

the spinster who first takes

on responsibility for raising the orphaned Tina, a rigid performance
of "duty" to one in need,
is a crime,

devoid of any human sympathy or perception,

and one which which nearly destroys Tina's character.

Stowe's narrator calls Miss Asphyxia's method of rearing Tina by a
cold and rigid system of rules "soul-murder--a dispensation of wrath
and death" and comments "such a person is commonly both obtuse in
sensibility and unimaginitive in temperament" (OTF p.l70).

Against

this Stowe places the "grandmotherly logic" of Mrs. Badger, whose
theory of child-rearing denies the possibility of abstracting general
principles for correct action, and emphasizes behavior suited to the
needs of the individual involved.

In a discussion with Aunt Lois and

Miss Mehitable on the best method for rearing children she argues
that:
'One live child puts all your treatises to
rout •••• There ain't any two children alike; and
what works with one won't work with another.
Folks have just got to open their eyes, and look
and see what the Lord meant when he put the child
tog e the r' ( Q!.K, p • 2 7 6) •
Stowe closes this discussion with the comment that people who locate
"rational" behavior in adherence to abstract principles,
rists on education," will see no value

in Mrs. Badger's perceptions,

and "will pronounce her a pig-headed, passionate,
hearted body, •••
mind"

impulsive,

entirely below the notice of a rational,

(OTF,p.278).

But despite its lack of
11

like "theo-

soft-

enquiring

intellectual respecti-

bility by the standards of the day,
based on a rationality of their own,

Mrs. Badger's views are soundly
the "psychological logic" of an

ethic of care, in which Stowe places much greater faith.
This vision of morality as responsiveness made effective by
psychological perception ,and its association with women,

reaches its

clearest expression in Stowe's description of Mary Scudder in TMW.
Mary is one of those
soul artists, who go through this world, looking
among their fellows with reverence, as one looks
amid the dust and rubbish of old shops for hidden
works of Titian and Leonardo, and, finding them,
however cracked or torn or painted over with tawdry daubs of pretenders, immediately recognize the
divine original, and set themselves to cleanse and
restore. Such be God's real priests •••• Many such
priests there be among women;--for to this ministry their nature calls them, endowed, as it is,
with fineness of fibre, and a subtile keenness of
perception outrunning slow-footed reason (!~!
p.606).

As the above comments on "theorists" and "slow-footed reason"
suggest,

Stowe's advocacy of an "ethic of care" is often closely tied

to criticism of a more abstract,

"objective" approach to morality.

Abstract principles in themselves, she feels, are too divorced from
humanity to be able to result in any genuinely benevolent action.

A

classic example of this is Simeon Brown, the slave-trader in TMW who
is, briefly, a great fan of Hopkins's complex, abstract system of
theology:
In his private life, Simeon was severe and dictatorial. He was one of that class of people who,
of a freezing day, will plant themselves directly
between you and the fire, and there stand and
argue to prove that selfishness is the root of all
evil. •• He was one of those men who suppose themselves submissive to the Divine will, to the
uttermost extent demanded by the extreme theology
of the day, simply because they have no nerves to
feel, no imagination to conceive what endless
suffer ing is (!~~, p. 562).

12

Simeon's shortcoming,

like Miss Asphyxia's,

is his total unwilling-

ness--or inability--to perceive what another might feel--and this
applies to the person shivering in front of him as well as to tormented sou Is.

In fact,

Simeon's absolute faith in moral (and theolog-

ical) logic seems to be part of what leads him astray--he confuses
reasoning correctly with doing right, and thus hides his selfishness
from himself.
With regard to social ethics, New England as Stowe presents it is
essentially at one.

Characters like Simeon Brown and Miss Asphyxia

may be grudgingly acknowledged as "upright" citizens, but they are
clearly on the fringes of the community, and are held in contempt by
its more outspoken members.

The only real conflict of values in these

novels is in the area of theology.

!~~

and OTF contain an intelligent

and complex analysis of New England Calvinism.

Stowe's identification

of its problems and points of conflict show her posing abstract,
formal logic against the "psychological logic," and give a clearer
sense of the intellectual basis of her ethical views.
For Stowe, just as social well-being is based upon a sense of
connection with fellow-members of a family or community, and morality
upon responsiveness to particular individual needs,

so, for her, spiri-

tual well-being is based upon a sense of relationship with God, and an
absolute faith in His loving responsiveness to the individual needs
(though not necessarily the conscious desires) of all His human children.
Her major criticism of Calvinism is that it destroys this sense of
relationship with God, denying that it is possible without a definite
and dramatic conversion experience,

and teaching that without this

conversion the individual is an enemy to God and hateful to him.
Such a doctrine of separation and hatred between God and the
majority of humans seems to her spiritually destructive.
13

She is

particularly concerned with its effect upon women, who she claims
found this theology "hardest to tolerate or assimilate," because,
she says,

"woman I s na tu re has never been consu 1 ted in theology."

as
(OTF

p.456). the problem is that women, unlike the male logicians who
construct such doctrines,

cannot help but make the connection between

abstract theories and a human reality which is felt as well as
thought:
But where theorists and philosophers tread with
sublime assurance, woman often follows with bleeding footsteps;-- women are always turning from
the abstract to the individual, and feeling where
the philosopher only thinks (!~~, p. 541-2).
Miss Mehitable Rossiter in OTF best describes the kind of anguish
that results from such teachings,

in a passage which points clearly to

a view of human life as deriving meaning from a sense of connection--a
belief that a cry of genuine need will be heard, understood, and
responded

to:
We are in ourselves so utterly helpless,--life is
so hard, so inexplicable, that we stand in perishing need of some helping hand, some sensible,
appreciable connection with God.
And yet for
years every cry of misery, every breath of
anguish, has been choked by the logical proofs of
theology;--that God is my enemy, or that I am his;
that every effort I make toward Him but aggravates
my offense (Q!! p.248).

These are thoughts which Miss Mehitable has in common with
several women characters in both novels.

But though Stowe associates

them particularly with women (since women, by their nature, are more
likely to perceive them and feel them deeply than men) she clearly
believes that her values are human values. Stowe is careful to include

----

male characters who in one way or another align themselves with the
same view,

such as Jonathan Rossiter,

who is lost in a bitter despair

like that of his sister and clings to Christ as an emblem of a pal14

pable human connection between God and humanity, and Harry Percival,
who argues for a sense of loving relationship with God as the primary
fact from which all theology must derive.
The cruelty of Calvinism is not limited to its separation of the
individual from God--what is even more disturbing about it to Stowe is
that it seems to demand an unconcern for the ultimate fate of others-whether it is to be salvation or eternal torment.

In demarrling that

believing Christians acquiesce--cheerfully--to the idea that the majority of humans will be damned for all eternity, Calvinist doctrine is
working directly against a vision of morality which demands that one
look upon the sufferings of others as one's own.
It is this inability to keep from being bound up in the fate of
those close to oneself that drives Mrs. Marvyn to the edge of madness
when her son James is presumed to have drowned in an "unregenerate"
state, and she rails against a God who can, by his own choice, harden
his heart against masses of people,

each beloved of their families and

companions, for his own glory:
'Think of all Godls power and knowledge used on
the lost to make them suffer ! ••• The number of the
elect is so small we can scarce count them for
anything!
Think what noble minds, what warm,
generous hearts, what splendid natures are wrecked
and thrown away by thousands and tens of thousands! How we love each other! how our hearts
weave into each other!
And all this ends ••• ' (!~!
p.734) •

Even for saintly Mary Scudder,

this aspect of Calvinism is

difficult to live with:
But when she looked around on the warm, living
faces of friends, acquaintances and neighbors,
viewing them as possible candidates for dooms so
fearfully different, she sometimes felt the walls
of her faith closing around her as an iron shroud
(!~!

p.542).

In a society like New England's,
15

in which theology is reality,

such theorizing can be seen almost as an act of violence, and like
most of the officially sanctioned violence in Stowe's fiction,it is
perpetrated by men who have allowed abstract thought and logical
principles to blind them to the lived human reality of what they do.
Jonathan Rossiter comments in OTF,

in a passage echoed frequently in

both novels:
'It is incredible, the ease and cheerfulness with
which a man in his study, who never had so much
experience of suffering as even a toothache would
give him, can arrange a system in which the everlasting torture of millions is casually admitted
a san i t em' ( 2.!! p. 2 5 7) •
Though some of these are men like Simeon Brown, who are simply
incapable of feelings for others, Stowe does not, on the whole, want
to condemn Calvinist theologians as heartless monsters. Indeed,

in her

comments on Hopkins and others Stowe makes clear her admiration,

if

not for their conclusions, at least for the impulse that drove them:
These hard old New England divines were the poets
of metaphysical philosophy, who built systems in
an artistic fervor, and felt self exhale from
beneath them as they rose into the higher regions
of thought (!~!'! p.541-2).
Her criticism is that

these theologians failed to see the impor-

tance of that combination of a sense of loving unity with God and
fellow-humans,

empathy,

and desire to ease suffering and aid the needy

which Stowe summarizes as "feeling" to their own moral and spiritual
life.

They therefore produce inhuman logical systems of theology,

devoid of the warmth and empathy which characterizes them as men.
Hopkins is the prime example of this. Stowe says of him that "the
only mistake made by the good man was that of supposing that the
elaboration of theology was preaching the gospel"

(!~!,!,p.58l).

His

doctrines alone draw in only "shrewd, hard thinkers, who delighted in
metaphysical subtleties"--men like Simeon Brown.
16

The rest,

who are

the "deep-hearted,

devoted natures," accept the theology out of love

for the man, won only by
"the gospel
visitations
teaching of
had thought

he was preaching constantly ••• by his
to homes of poverty and sorrow ••• his
those whom no one else in those days
of teaching C!~!! p.583).

Stowe1s final conclusions on Calvinism are too complex to discuss
here.

But I think it is clear, from her presentation of the community

and of the tensions between objective and sympathetic,

logical and

psychological reasoning on ethics and theology that Stowe sees a world
which coheres more through bonds of sympathy, care and gratitude than
rchical structures,

through any external

that she places her

greatest faith in the moral power of "feeling" rather than that of
objective principles,

and that she is associates "objective" reason-

ing, on any subject concerned with humans, with inhuman results.
The issue here is clearly not "head versus heart."
criticism of "logic" is not anti-intellectual--in fact,

Stowe's
these books,

and all of their characters, are deeply concerned with intellectual
issues.

What she is criticizing is intellect divorced from any ref-

erence to a landscape of human relationships.
not a substitute for

thought~

"Feeling" for Stowe is

it is rather one of the givens from

which any reasoning must start, and it continually ensures that
thought never strays too far from a grounding in lived human reality.
In moral terms,

it is also an important link between thought and

action in the community.
Stowe's views on matters of "head and heart" are illustrated best
by her portraits of characters like Mary Scudder in

!~!!,

with her

"earnest young face, ever kindling with feeling and bright with intellectl!

(p.583),

or

like Harry Percival in OTF,
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For these characters,

intellect and feeling are never at odds--they are so inextricably
intertwined that neither would think of trying to separate one from
another.

Their feeling of connection with God and humanity forms the

foundation of their thought on theological and moral matters,

and the

results often pose challenges to colder doctrines which are logical as
well as emotional.
When we come to Stowe1s anti-slavery novels we are dealing with a
very different world.

To Stowe, slavery is the height of immorality,

and thus the South (and the North as well,

to the extent that it

supports slavery), unlike the New England of OTF and TMW is a sick
society in which moral disorder has been legally institutionalized and
socially sanctioned.

Because in such a society law and morality must

be fundamentally at odds, there is in these novels a much more polarrized vision of the tensions between a legalistic, "objective" morality and one based on an emotionally rich human response to individuals.

The outlines of Stowe1s advocacy of the latter afld critique

of the former are therefore much clearer.
But more important, the situation in which the novels were written is very different.

The New England novels are essentially reflec-

tions on the past--whatever difficulties Stowe had with Calvinist
theology, she certainly did not view it as a clear and present moral
threat to the population at large.

But slavery was.

In these novels,

then, we see the response of an ethic of care, taking as its basis the
empathetic response of one individual to another,

to a problem of

institutionalized evil on a national scale.
In Stowe1s definition of the evil of slavery, we again see her
vision of the centrality of human relationships to moral order and to
personal meaning in life.

She describes slavery's evil primarily in
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terms of its effects upon human and divine relationships among slaves
and slaveowners alike.
The clearest--and most often noted--example of this is slavery's
destruction of black families.

UTC opens with the threatened separa-

tion of George Harris from his wife Eliza, of Eliza from her son, and
finally of Uncle Tom from his whole family.

From here on, Stowe

repeatedly portrays slaveowners and traders dividing husbands from
wives, brothers from sisters, and mothers from children.
Though Stowe stresses the personal anguish this causes slaves,
there is also another point to this.

When feelings of connection with

others form the foundation of morality,

the disregard for family ties

exhibited by slaveowners and traders could have moral consequences for
slaves.

This is the basis for Mrs.

Shelby's horror at selling Tom and

little Harry:
I have taught them the duties of the family, of
parent and child, and husband and wife1 and how
can I bear to have this open acknowledgement that
we care for no tie, no duty, no relation, however
sacred, compared with money?15
Her husband later unknowingly concedes what Stowe considers one of the
greatest indictments of slavery--that it makes a morality based on
sustaining family connections virtually impossible among slaves--when
he responds to his wife that she has "burdened them with a morality
above

their condition and prospects"

(UTC p.373).

It is not only with regard to relationships within the family
that slavery is destructive:

the slaveowner's denial of fellow-

feeling with slaves also has demoralizing effects on both.
St. Clare's impulsive,

Augustine

dictatorial nephew Henrique is dangerously

corrupted by his constant association with dependent and subservient
people whose emotional and physical well-being he is never obliged to
consider.

The lighter-skinned servants in St. Clare's own household
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imitate this attitude in their contempt and unconcern for darker,
"well-bred" fellow-slaves.

Rosa's and Jane's

less

inhuman treatment of

black Topsy--responding to her hideous bruises and scars with the
comment '''don't that show
uns!

she's a

limb? ••• I

so disgusting!"'(QTC p.355)--mimics

disregard for their feelings and needs.

hate

these

nigger

young-

their white mistress's total
Indeed,

the ever-present

brutality of slavery eventually eats away the humanity of even such a
sensitive,

loving man as St. Clare--the hopelessness of responding

humanely to all the suffering he sees around him makes him finally
give up the attempt:
'Of course, in a community so organized, what can
a man of honorable and humane feelings do, but
shut his eyes all he can, and harden his heart?
I
can't buy every poor wretch I see.
I can't turn
knight-errant, and undertake to redress every
individual case of wrong in such
a city as this.
The most I can do is try to keep out of the way of
i t i ( Q!£ , p • 3 2 8) •
Finally,

slavery obstructs that most crucial of relationships:

that between the individual,
first,

slave or free,

and God.

This happens,

in that intelligent slaves and conscientious whites are dis-

gusted by the hypocritical religious moralism of slaveowners,
clearly designed to protect their own privilege.

so

John Van Trompe, a

former slaveowner who has turned against slavery after seeing its
injustices, comments:
"it was years and years before I'd jine the
church, 'cause the ministers round in our parts
used to preach that the Bible went in for these
ere cuttings up, ••• so I took up agin 'em, Bible
and a II' (Q!£ p. 1 6 0 ) •
George Harris,

though in his heart he wants to believe in God,

similarly held back by the perception that slaveowners seem to have
God on their side.

Exhorted by his wife to '''trust in God,'" he

replies,
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is

II an1t a Christian like you, Eliza; my heart's

full of bitterness;
does he let things
good, but my heart
any how' (Q!£ p p • 6 2 -

I can't trust in God.
Why
be so? ••• 1 wish I could be
burns, and can't be reconciled,
3) •

The ultimate representation of the evil of slavery,
Legree's plantation,

is a cruel and total

~nversion

life on Simon

of the vision of a

community sustained by connection and sympathy seen in the New England
novels.

While the New England community coheres through connection

and love, Legree holds his plantation together through isolation and
hatred:
Legree ••• governed his plantation by a sort of
resolution of forces.
Sambo and Quimbo cordially
hated each other; the plantation hands, one and
all, cordially hated them~ and, by playing off one
against the other, he was pretty sure, through one
or the other of the three parties, to get informed
of whatever was on foot in the place (UTC p.493).
With human connections constantly thwarted, morality is virtually
impossible.

On his arrival,

Uncle Tom finds nothing but "the gross,

unrestricted animal selfishness of human beings, of whom nothing good
was expected or desired"

(UTC,p.495).

These people have been torn away

from all the natural connections of family and home community, and
everything conspires against their developing any fellow-feeling among
themselves:

Cassie tells him, "When you've been here a month,

be done helping anybody;
your own sk in! II

you'll

you'll find it hard enough to take care of

(UTC p. 5 04).

She sums up the re ign ing ph i losophy of

the place when she says:
lAnd what are these miserable low dogs you work
with, that you should suffer on their account?
Everyone of them would turn against you, the
first time they got a chance.
They are all of lem
as low and cruel to each other as they can be;
there's no use in your suffering to keep from
h u r tin g the m' (Q!£ p. 5 1 3 ) •
Cassie herself has long since decided that attachments can only
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cause pain to a slave--she kills her last son in his infancy,

and she

stops Emmeline's gesture of affection with the words "'you'll get me
to loving you;

and I

never

mean to love anything,

again!'"

(UTC,p.580).

In this atmosphere of personal isolation and despair, any sense
of God's presence and concern is also missing.

Told by Tom that God

is everywhere, a slave woman replies "'Lor, you an't gwine to make me
believe dat ar!
tells Tom,

I

know de Lord an't here'"

(UTCp.497).

Cassie also

'''There's no use calling on the Lord,--he never hears •••

there isn't any God, I believe; or, if there is, he's taken sides
against us'" (UTC,p.512).
to cling to his faith

Even Tom himself has a long,

hard struggle

in the face of God's apparent silence here.

In contrast to Legree and his demonic world, "good" slaveowners
in UTC,

like the Shelbys, are those who have a nurturing, almost

parental attitude toward slaves, and try to turn their plantations
into family-like communities founded on trust and love.

Mr. Shelby's

hold over Tom is not one of power and violence--Tom feels an almost
maternal affection and responsibility toward him because he has cared
for him since infancy.

Similarly,

mother than a mistress to Eliza,

Mrs. Shelby acts as more of a
and the latter's obedience stems from

the dutiful love of a child rather than from fear or compulsion.

Even

the embittered George Harris sees in this bond of love a genuine claim
on his wife:
'There is some sen se in (obed ience], in your ca se;
they have brought you up like a child, fed you,
clothed you, indulged you, and taught you, so that
you have had a good education~ that is some reason
why they should claim you' (UTC,p.62).
But such harmony and unity in slavery, Stowe stresses, is ultimately unsustainable, because unsupported by the external structures
of the society:
Whoever visits some estates [in Kentucky].
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and

witnesses the good-humored indulgence of some
masters and mistresses, and the affectionate
loyalty of some slaves, might be tempted to dream
of the oft-fabled poetic legend of a patriarchal
institution, and all that; but over and above the
scene there broods a portentous shadow--the shadow
of la~.
So long as the law considers all these
human beings, with beating hearts and living
affections, only as so many things belonging to a
master,--so long as the failure, or misfortune, or
imprudence, or death of the kindest owner, may
cause them any day to exchange a life of kind
protection for one of hopeless misery and toil,-so long it is impossible to make anything beautiful or desirable in the best-regulated administration of slavery
(UTC,pp.50-1).
Law is here presented as a system alien to the moral community,
which disregards and cuts across its bonds.

This vision is at the

core of the critique of objective "logic" and structures of rules as a
means of making moral decisions, which Stowe returns to continually
throughout UTC and

Dre~.

structures is obvious:

On one level,

Stowe's difficulty with these

the external, objectivized structure of

society--its religious and social values as well as its laws--is
naturally designed to uphold that society as it is.
holding society,

it is supportive of slavery,

as a further sanction of the original wrong:

In a slave-

and its support serves
thus ministers find that

the Bible supports the institution of slavery and the rights of the
master,

and a social "code of honor"

makes it "ungentlemanly" to

cheat a trader of his slave.
This tendency is most evident in the legal system.
era t est h r

0

Stowe reit-

ugh 0 u t Q!f. t hat the I a w pIa c e s no lim i t o nth e power

0

f a

master over a slave, and that therefore it can do nothing to ensure
any sort of humanity in the institution of slavery.

In Dred she

devotes several pages to a legal decision by Judge Clayton,

in which,

while lamenting the conflicts between "'the feelings of the man and
the duty of the magistrate,'" he overturns a previous decision in
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favor of an abused slave woman.

He concludes that it is

the imperative duty of the judges to recognize
full dominion of !he Q~ner over th~ slave •••• And
t his wed 0 up 0 nth e g r 0 u n d t hat !hil§. £Q!!i.!!iQ'!!
essential to the value QK slaves ~ propertYL to
!h~ ~~'£.!!f.i!y.
!h~ !!~l§.!~f. ~.!!£ !h~ E..!!!?li.£ !f.~.!!':'
quilli~ ~atly dependent upon their subordination!
In other words, judges are obliged to decide on legal cases in a way
that maintains order in the society as it is, not to decide on the
justice of the society's institutions.

But the Judge is unusual in

his recognition of a possible gap between what must be upheld legally
and what can be upheld morally.

Ordinary citizens, less conscious

than a judge is likely to be of the ambiguities of law, tend to
associate what is legal with what is good and proper, so that slaveholding law gives the power of the master over slave a kind of moral
sanction.
This is apparent, for example, in the conversation between George
Harris and Mr. Wilson, his well-meaning and essentially sympathetic
former employer.
good" to George,

Mr. Wilson !!deem(sJ it his duty to go on talking
despite the fact

his master's treatment of him.

that he !!Ican't pretend to defend ' "

He exhorts George to return to his

cruel owner, on the grounds that his running away is both !!'setting
(h i

nV self

in oppos i t ion

to

the

laws "' and

." w icked--unscr iptura 1. •••

the angel commanded Hagar to return to her mistress ••• and the apostle
sent back Onesimus to his master lll

(UTC p.lS3).

These pro-slavery

structures of law and religious doctrine have become the arbiters of
"goodness," so that Mr.

Wilson actually feels that he is doing wrong

by giving in to his subjective desire to help George.
Such a critique of these structures may not seem necessarily
incompatible with with an objective,

justice-oriented view of morality.

Judge Clayton's son Edward, for example, abandons the pursuit of law
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in the South as a means of doing good because he realizes that the law

!!1! i! 1!!!!!l£1! i!l

!h.~

£2..!:!!h. i sin com pat i b 1 e wit h his

justice extended equally to all.
the

£2.!l!~!l! 0

0

w net h i c

0

f

His disagreement is primarily with

f the 1 a win a s I a v e hoI din g s tat e, w h i c h her e ali z e s

makes justice for

the slave impossible,

rather than with law per see

One might say that, at least for Edward Clayton, Southern law is not
objective and impersonal enough, in that it does not accord blacks the
same treatment as whites.
But beneath

this obvious critique of immoral

content in the

codes and structures of slaveholding society there is a more farreaching critique of the moral problems inherent in objective codes
and structures themselves as guardians of morality.

Stowe is concerned

about the ways that objectivity, logic, and legalism--in a slaveholding society or out of it--can be used as a means of blinding
oneself to the

inconvenient moral claims made on one by other indi-

Turning a living,

viduals.

Stowe recognizes,

breathing human being into an abstraction,

is often the first step toward allowing oneself to

behave inhumanly toward him or her.
This

insight is at the core of Stowe's criticism of slavery.

Throughout UTC and Dred she portrays the supporters of slavery as
people who have retreated into abstract arguments to prevent themselves--with varying degrees of success--from seeing and responding
to the human reality of the institution they support.

This is

easiest--and hence the greatest temptation--for the makers of public
policy,

such as politicians,

church leaders,

and social theorists.

They are dealing with institutions and abstractions and the people
they are affecting are,

for

the most part, strangers to them.

Remain-

ing indifferent to the individual suffering they cause is simply a
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matter of not making the effort to seek it out, and this indifference
is sanctioned by a moral code which would condemn such a concern as
"weakness" or

lack of "objectivity."

Senator Bird in UTe, for example, argues eloquently in favor of
the Fugitive Slave Bill, and against the "sentimental weakness of
those who would put the welfare of a few miserable fugitives before
great state interests," only because "his idea of a fugitive was only
an idea of the let ter s

tha t

spell the wor d" (UTe p.lS S) •

The whole

issue is distant and abstract to him, and he considers it immoral to
consider it otherwise:
'we mustn't suffer our feelings to run away with
our judgement: you must consider it's a matter of
private feeling,--there are great public interests
involved, ••• we must put aside our private feelings' (Q!~,p.l44).
Ultimately,

a policy maker or theorist may become so adept at

distancing himself this way that even "the magic of the real presence
of distress" does not affect him,

like the "thorough-paced political

economist" Stowe describes in Dred, who,
surpr ised ••• by the near view of a case of actual
irremediable distress... would soon have consoled
himself by a species of mental algebra, that the
greatest good of the greatest number was nevertheless secure; therefore there was no occasion to
be troubled about infinitesimal amounts of sufferin g (Q£.~Q, I I, p. 1 4 l) •
But an even more telling condemnation of this process of retreating into abstraction to deny connection is that it can also

oper~te

on

the level of the more personal, almost familial relationships of
mutual care and trust which should form the basis for a wider-extending ethic of care and responsibility.

Stowe's description of the way

Mr. Shelby copes with selling Tom and Harry in the first part of UTe
is a good example.

Mr. Shelby can only begin to feel comfortable with

having sold Tom and Harry by distancing himself from the personal
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meaning of the event.

His wife expresses her outrage at the sale in

terms of their relationships with these particular people:

"'Whatl our

Tom?--that good, faithful creature!--been your faithful servant from a
boy! •••• (a n dJ 1 i t t 1 e H a r r y, poor Eli z a
Mr.

ISO

n 1 y chi 1 d !

I II

(Q!'£ , p • 8 2), but

Shelby responds by making a generalized statement about what

society sanctions,
mon s ter,

IIII

don't know why

for do ing wha t

I

am to be rated,

everyone doe s every day'"

as if I were a

(UT.£,p. 8 2)

and

appealing to conclusions on the morality of slavery by "'many wise and
pi

0

u s men'" (Q!'£ , p • 8 3 ) •
Shelby also makes plans to avoid witnessing the actual result of

what he's done:
be

0

ff•

"'I'm going to get out my horse bright and early,

I can I t s e e Tom, t hat • s a f act • .. (Q!'£, p • 8 6 ) •

between this and his arguments is obvious:

and

The con nee t ion

Shelby's conscience-easing

rationalizations are only effective if he can nullify the human connection between himself and Tom,

and hence deny his responsibility to

behave toward him in a caring way.

His need, however, to add physical

distance to the psychological distance of abstract generalization,
does indicate some discomfort with the morality of what he is doing:
" I twa sin v a i nth a the s aid to him s elf t hat h e had a
it,--that everybody did it •••

!.i9.hl to do

he could not satisfy his own feelings"

(UTC, p. 169) •
With the discovery of Eliza's flight, however, this discomfort
disappears, as does the tone of apology toward his wife.

Shelby here

can retreat into a clear and established system of rules for behavior-the Southern code of honor.
of Eliza he exclaims,
my honor!'" (UTC,p.92).
flight,

Now in response to Mrs.

'''Wife,

you talk

Unlike his wife,

like a

Shelby's support

fooU •••• [thisJ touches

who covertly aids her

servant's

Shelby unhesitatingly gives Haley's right to a fair bargain
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precedence over his personal,

unofficial responsibility to Eliza,

telling Haley that he is in no way "'partner to any unfairness in this
matter'" and promising him '''every assistance,
servants,

&C.,

in

the

recovery of your

in the use of horses,

property'" (UTC,p.95).

The contrast between this moral outlook and Mrs. Shelby's attempt
to uphold the values of connection and care is evident throughout this
section-- she immediately refuses to be an "accomplice or help in this
cruel business" and resolves instead to give her sympathy and support
to Uncle Tom's family,

so that "they shall see, at any rate,

their mistress can feel for and with them" (UTC,p.87).

that

The event also

leads her to an understanding of the evil of slavery which parallels
Stowe's own.

It is "Ia curse to the master and a curse to the

slave,1It and her attempts to '"gild''' it with '''kindness, and care,
and instruction'" were doomed to failure because of the institution's
fundamental disregard for human connection.
In the final conversation on Eliza's escape,

then,

we see a clear

example of the kind of conflict between the "masculine" ethic of
objective

rules and the "feminine" one of empathetic response which

will be central to the rest of the novel:
'Come, come, Emily,' said he ••• 'you allow
yourself to feel too much.'
'Feel too much! Am not I a woman,--a mother?
Are we not both responsible to God for this poor
g i r 1?
My God! I a y not t his sin too u r c h a r g e. I
'What sin, Emily? You see yourself that we
have only done what we were obliged to.1
'There's an awful feeling of guilt about it
though, ••• I can't reason it away' (9.1:£, p.133).
The conflict hidden in this conversation goes deeper than a
simple difference of opinion.

There is a basic gap in comprehension

between Mr. Shelby and his wife,

which points up the problem of intel-

lectual and moral legitimacy faced by the female advocate of an ethic
of care.

"Feeling" to Mr.

Shelby signifies a purely local emotional
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response which is extraneous to the realm of moral and social order.
Hence negative feelings about an action which is defensible in "objective" terms are an indulgence, or at least an unnecessary discomfort.
"Feeling" to Mrs. She

however,

is at the center of moral order.

The central experience of connection, care and responsibili

she has

as a mother is the model for moral relations with the rest of humanity.
Here it is abstract judgements, made without reference to the real
human connections involved, which are extraneous, so that guilt felt
at severing connections can't be "reasoned" away.

But because she

lacks the terms to argue the logic and legitimacy of her view, her
reply leaves the impression that she is simply falling prey to her
irrational emotions.
The same problem emerges in Mrs. Bird's conversation with her
husband on the passing of the Fugitive Slave Bill.

In her husband's

eyes, her feelings on the matter are no more than a kind of simplistic, mushy emotionalism, made agreeable by its piety and warm-heartedness, but having no real bearing on the complex social and moral
issues involved.

Not surprisingly, he views her insistence on them

with "a whimsical mixture of amusement and vexation" (UTC,p.l46).
But with an awareness of the coherent ethical view which underlies Mrs.

Bird's "feelings," and the centrality of that view to

Stowe's critique of slavery,
n a 1.

her response begins to seem less irratio-

Fro m her per s p e c t i v e, the pro b 1 e m lie s a s m u chi nth e

the arguments as in their content.

!~!.!!!..§. 0

f

Political argument is founded upon

premises which mean that discussions will go "'round and round a plain
right thing'!! without being able to see it.
reasoning,
like Mrs.

John,--especially

reasoning on

Mrs. Bird's !!'I hate

such

subjects'!!

Shelby's refusal to !!reason away" her sense of guilt,
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p.145) ,
is

essentially a rejection of argument on those terms. It is not a rejection of any use of the intellect, but rather seeks to replace this
particular kind of reasoning with that referred to (negatively) by the
selfish woman on the steamboat with Uncle Tom, who in response to a
neighbor's comment on slavery's "'outrages on the feelings and affections,'"
c las s

replies,
f per son s

0

'''We can't reason from our feelings

to those of this

,II (Q!.f , p • 2 0 0 ) •

Critics' view of this response has tended to parallel that of Mr.
Shelby and Senator Bird.

Contemporary reviewers usually condemned

Stowe for lack of objectivity and respect for law and political process.

She was unable,

one said,

high above human passions,,,17 and,

to attain the "judicial seat ••• fixed
in typical feminine fashion,

issues entirely by her uncontrolled emotions.

judged

Foster, who has

greater respect overall for the intelligence of Stowe's analysis of
slavery,

still sees UTC as having "a tendency to split into two books"

which work against each other.

One is the "literary-senti~ental

pious," best represented by Mrs. Bird, which the book would be better
without

(the novel is "a battle between piety and •••

talent"),

other the "sharp intelligence" (and "masculine edge")

and the

of Stowe's

critique of the institution of slavery through Augustine St. Clare. 18
What Mrs. Bird actually represents, though,

is Stowe's own rejec-

tion of the premises of pro-slavery arguments because they deny the
place of empathy--a rejection which manifests itself as much in Augustine St.

Clare's reflections as in Mary Bird's.

Stowe is nowhere

particularly interested in arguing with slaveholders on their own
ground--in trying to prove, for example, that slavery does not bring
about "the greatest good for

the greatest number."

attacks the whole idea of dealing with living,
as abstractions,

Instead,

she

breathing individuals

terms in a "moral calculus," just as in the New
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England novels she condemned theologians who "deal...

with the great

question of the salvation or damnation of myriads as a problem of
theological algebra,

to be worked out by their inevitable x,y,ztl (OTF,

p.562).
To the extent that Stowe does attack the content of pro-slavery
arguments,

she usually does so by providing an alternative logic which

does not so much disprove the original as show the arbitrary quality
inherent in the choice of a basis for argument.
carrying Uncle Tom south,

On the steamboat

a clergyman breaks into a conversation on

the morality of slavery with the comment,
tI'I t' s undoubted ly the in ten t ion of Prov ide nee
that the African race should be servants,--kept in
a low cond i t ion •••• "Cur sed be Canaan; a ser van t of
servants shall he be," the scripture says •••• and
we must not set up our opinion against that'"
(UTC , P • 200) •
In response, a young man "with a face expressive of great feeling
and intelligence" breaks in and remarks,
would that men should do unto you,
suppose ••• that

is scr ipture,

do ye even so unto them."

as much as

"honest drover" John concludes,

"P'AII things whatsoever ye

'''Wal,

"Cursed be Canaan.'''"

As the young

both texts are equally valid bases for a

scriptural argument on slavery.
former

The

it seems quite as plain a text,

stranger, ••• to poor fellows like us, now'" C!!!£,p.20l).
parson's comment points out,

I

The older man's preference for

is clearly based on unconscious self-interest,

the

while the young

man's advocacy of the latter is based on his ability to reason from
his own feelings to those of others:
'My friend, ••• how can you, how dare you, carryon
a trade like this?
Look at these poor creatures!
Here I am, rejoicing in my heart that I am going
home to my wife and child; and the same bell which
is a signal to carry me onward towards them will
part this poor man and his wife forever' (UTC,p.202).
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This recognition that seemingly "objective" logical arguments can
be constructed to prove the necessity of almost anything is also at
the core of St.

Clare's cynical commentary on slavery:

'Suppose that something should bring down the
price of cotton once and forever, and make the
whole slave property a drug in the market, don't
you think we should soon have another version of
the Scripture doctrine?
What a flood of light
would pour into the church, all at once, and how
immediately it would be discovered that everything
in the Bible and reason went the other wayl'
(UTC,p. 281) •
St. Clare recognizes that the motivation behind any such argument is
an attempt to rationalize and obscure a refusal to respond. The fundamental perspective underlying pro-slavery logic is that of the "aristocrat":
'Now, an aristocrat, you know, the world over, has
no human sympathies, beyond a certain line in
soc iety •••• Wha t would be har dsh ip and dis tr e ss and
injustice in his own class, is a cool matter of
co u r s e ina not her 0 n e I (Q!'£, p • 3 5 5 ) •
What St. Clare has done,

essentially,

and coherent terms what Mrs.

is to articulate in intelligent

Bird meant by saying "I hate reasoning."

The major difference between the two is that Mrs. Bird has a greater
faith

in the ability (and willingness) of an individual to see through

the maze of obscuring logic to a "plain right thing," and then do it.
Here too, perhaps both are reasoning from their own feelings,
is a notable fact that Mrs.

Bird acts,

What doe s s u c hac t ion con sis t
Cabin,

in which, as we have seen,

0

while St.

for

it

Clare does not.

f? I nth e w 0 rId

0

f

Q!!.£l~
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moral disorder is institutionalized,

how does one approach the task of re-establishing moral order?
Stowe's critique of slavery makes clear,

As

in such a world the "objec-

tive," rule-oriented approach to ethical reason and action which
Gilligan describes as characteristically "masculine" is not appropriate.

positive moral action in these novels tends,
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rather,

to align

closely with Gilligan's description of "feminine" moral priorities.
Moral characters seek first and foremost to maintain relationships, both for the sake of the relationships themselves and because
lines of communication must be kept open for moral response to be
pos sible.

This explains why, for example, Mrs. Bird and Mrs. Shelby

respond to their husbands' morally dubious actions in a way which Ann
Douglas associates with the weak and acquiescent credo
popularized by Go~~ and other similar ladies'
magazines: women were to use the moral suasion of
example and mild precept to turn their men to more
humane (or feminine) ways: women were never directly to oppose men, no matter how stupid or
brutal they might be. 19
Mrs. Shelby would never "threaten to leave" her husband as a way of
stopping him from selling Tom and Harry,
ought,

as Douglas later suggests she

because to try to assert the moral responsibility implied in

human connections (i.e. his with Tom) by breaking off her connection
with him would be a contradiction in terms.
Furthermore,

it is this connection which keeps open the possi-

bility of moral change in her husband.

This process is akin to what

Douglas describes as "the moral suasion of example and mild precept,"
which was all women were permitted to oppose to the stupidity and
brutality of men. But, at least as Stowe intends it, this is not the
indirect, unassertive, and oppressively limiting stance that modern
critics like Douglas often take it to be.

Again,

it is important here

to "separate the description of care and connection from the vocabulary
of inequality and oppression."20

Within a view of moral order as

relying on connection and response to need,

the "act of assertion"

needed to try to reestablish order "is an act not of aggression but of
communication."21

The concern which both Emily Shelby and Mary Bird

show for getting across their moral point without seriously alienating
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their husbands stems not from dependence and fear but from a sense
that keeping lines of communication open is an important moral priority.
This concern is linked with a determination to maintain the web
of universal responsibility and care in the face of an official structure which denies its legitimacy and works to dissolve its bonds.
Moral characters persist in viewing situations of moral choice in
terms of the varying needs for care and help of the individuals
involved ,
for Mrs.

rather than in terms of objective classifications.

Shelby,

Thus

covertly aiding Eliza's escape easily takes pre-

cedence over issues of legality or "honor," as for Mrs.

Bird the

presence of a suffering fugitive makes the existence of a Fugitive
Slave Bill irrelevant.

This is also the whole basis for moral choice

in the Ohio Quaker community Stowe portrays.

The Quakers are as

willing to give aid to a suffering and abandoned slavecatcher as to a
fugitive,

even though he could conceivably betray them.

Here the

Quakers resist the temptation to objectify what they are doing into a
"cause" the "greater good" of which is more important than anyone
individual.
These moral values are also what defines Uncle Tom as a character.

He is not concerned with what rights,

in fairness, he is enti-

tled to claim for himself, but with what the needs of others around
him are which it is possible for him to fulfill.

This, rather than

acquiescence to an oppressive and unjust law, explains his refusal to
run away at the beginning and the end of the book.

Although he

recognizes that others, such as Eliza and Cassie, can run away without
sin, he himself puts concern for others before his own needs: at the
Shelbys' the concern is for the slaves who would be sold in his stead,
and at Legree's,

for those he might yet be able to help to God if he
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remains.
Even with an understanding of the ethical perspective which
underlies the action of characters like Tom, however, there are still
questions which can be raised about what appears to be the limited
Stowe IS

effectiveness of this approach to the problem of slavery.
rejection of the kind of abstract,

"greatest good" arguments prevalent

in politics seems to confine moral action to an individual level--the
level of personal help or influence.

It is hard then to see how she

intends to bring about change on an institutional level.
for the reformist seems to be Edward Clayton in Dred,

The model

who abandons his

attempt to reform his culture in favor of flight and the foundation of
a model community with his former slaves in Canada, or the Quakers,
who help many a fugitive slave but will not resist or "speak evil of
[the]

rulers" who penalize them for doing so (UTC,p.224).
Further,

Stowels rejection of aggression and violence,

self-defense, seems to doom slaves to the status of victims.

even in
The

title character in Dred, for example, originally plans a violent
uprising as retribution for the sins of the slaveholders, and to
rescue oppressed slaves. Through her presentation of his character
(Dred speaks almost exclusively in the language of Old Testament
prophecy) and situation of slaves in the novel, Stowe makes clear that
such retribution would be entirely just.
can take place,

But before the insurrection

Dred is converted from his Old Testament revenge

orientation to Christian patience and pacifism, and is eventually
killed by slave hunters. The ultimate representation of the pacifist
as victim, of course, is Uncle Tom, who passes up the opportunity to
kill Legree and free the whole plantation from a demonic and soulkilling master, and is cruelly beaten to death as a reward.
Clearly a large part of the explanation for this orientation lies
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in Stowe's Christianity--Tom's reward

(and Dred's)

is a greater and

surer one than this world can offer, so that his fate, and even his
effectiveness, on earth is not the only matter for consideration.

But

there is a more pragmatic reason also for Stowe's rejection of violence, one which relates to the moral perspective I have been outlining here.

Stowe quite accurately perceives that violence will cut

the lines of communication decisively,

making it impossible to bring

about change in the perceptions of those doing wrong.

Bringing vio-

lence into a conflict will polarize all concerned, and make change
impossible unless imposed by force (which it would be unlikely for
slaves to be able to do).
On the issue of the scale of effectiveness of attempts,
Stowe's moral framework,

within

to restore moral order, we must finally step

out of the world of her novels to understand her view.

Stowe's view

of the proper response to the moral evil of slavery--and of the likely
effec tiveness of that response--is ultimately to be found not in the
act ion s

0

fan yon e

Tom's Cabin
- - ----

itself.

0

f her c h a r act e r s but i nth e act

0

f w r i tin g

.!:!l!£.!~

Where moral order is seen as the recognition by

all of interconnectedness and inter responsiveness,

the conviction that

change is possible at all translates into a conviction that people can
be made to see and understand suffering and their responsibility for
it,

and that they will then act on the basis of that understanding.

Stowe clearly expresses this conviction in her appeal to her readers
at the end of UTC:
when [the author] heard ••• Chr istian and humane
people actually recommending the remanding [o~]
escaped fugitives into slavery, as a duty binding
on good citizens,--when she heard, on all hands,
from kind, compassionate and estimable people, •••
deliberations and discussions as to what Christian
duty could be on this head,--she could only think,
These men and Christians cannot know
what slavery
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is; if they did, such a question could never be
open for discussion.
And from this arose a desire
to exhibit it in a livin~ £~~ati£ reality (UTC,p.623).
With this in mind, Stowe's use of the techniques of "sentimental"
fiction,

the point on which she has received the most and strongest

criticism from both contemporary and modern critics, needs to be reevaluated.

Stowe is undeniably making a conscious effort to appeal to

the hearts of her readers--to stir up strong emotions on behalf of her
characters.

But this is being done neither so that uncontrolled

emotion may cloud judgement and reason,
suggest,

as Foster and many others

nor to evoke the kind of complacent,

"narcissistic" orgy of

feeling which Douglas describes at the beginning of The Feminization
of American Cultur~.22

Rather Stowe is trying to initiate in her

readers the kind of "reasoning" process referred to by the woman on
the steamboat--the use of one's own experience of relationships to
gain insight into another's perpective.

An "objectivity" which denies

a place to this kind of understanding is actually partiality,

for it

refuses to recognize the ways reason can be twisted to self-interest:
One might almost imagine that there were no such
thing as absolute truth, since a change of situation or temperament is capable of changing the
whole force of an argument ••• We shall never have
all the materials for absolute truth on this subject, t i l l we take into account, with our own
views and reasonings, the views and reasonings of
those who have bowed down to the yoke, and felt
the iron enter into their souls.
We all console
ourselves too easily for the sorrows of others.
We talk and reason coolly of that which, did we
feel it ourselves, would take away all power of
composure and self-control.
We have seen how the
masters feel and reason •••• We must add, also, to
our estimate, the feelings and reasonings of the
slave (~~~£,II,p.2l3).
To this end,

the narrator of UTC continually asks the reader

directly to consult his or her own feelings:
Harry...

"If it were Y.£.!:!£.

that were going to be torn from you by a brutal trader ••• how
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fast could Y2.!! walk?"(UTC,p.I05).

Certainly this serves to heighten

the emotional intensity of the experience of reading the novel,

with

whatever pleasure that entails in itself, but the narrator constant
reminds the reader that this emotional experience refers outside of
the novel to actual society.

The reader uses it as a basis for under-

standing the lived reality of slavery, something he or she is likely
to lose track of otherwise,

just as the Quaker Ruth '''uses [her] self

only to learn how to love [hE;!r;]

neighbor'"

(UTC,p.22

This stress on empathy, of course, also explains Stowe's tendency
to focus on victims rather than victors.

The re-establishment of

moral order is dependent on the communication of a need for response
and care,

and therefore the novel with seeks to make that communica-

tion must focus on those who need care rather than on those, like
George Harris,

who can take care of themselves.

To point out a coherent and distinctively feminine ethical view
which underlies the characters, actions, and opinions expressed in
Stowe's fiction,

to pick out a legitimate and perceptive critique of

the dominant masculine view which is contained within it, and to show
the ways in which that dominant view can distort,

trivialize,

and

finally disregard both the contrasting ethic and its implied critique
--all of these will not eliminate certain recurring problems of awkwardness and cliche in Stowe's writing,

problems which make it unlikely

that Stowe will ever be classed with the finest literary craftsmen of
the 19th century.

But it can lead to a greater respect for

the

intelligence and perception which underlie the novels--their psychological craftsmanship--and to a less ambivalent assessment of the
power and appeal of Uncle Tom's

f~bin.

the self-interest of the Southerner,

Stowe may have underestimated

and the prejudice of the Norther-

ner, such that the results of her consciousness raising efforts were not
38

as peaceful, Christian, and loving as she hoped; but on the whole the
assumptions on which she wrote UTC were no more irrational, naive, or
impractical than any moral view which maintains that actual improvements in the morality of society can be brought about.

The ethic

which informed the writing of Uncle Tom's Cabin is, in part, validated
by the novel's achievement in awakening the nation's conscience about
slavery.
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